National Scams List: Singapore’s New Anti-Scam Bill

How Singapore plans to link scam warnings, service providers, and faster action on suspicious accounts

Singapore wants to catch scams earlier by joining up the warning signs that different companies each see on their own. On 4 August 2026, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill in Parliament for its First Reading. One of the main ideas in the Bill is a shared platform called the National Scams List, or NSL.

The name sounds like a public blacklist, but that is not what it is. The NSL is being built by the Home Team Science and Technology Agency together with the Police as a tool for the authorities and certain service providers to share scam information. The point is to bring the warning signs together in one place, so that suspicious accounts and services can be spotted sooner.

One thing to keep in mind. At the time of writing, on 13 August 2026, this was still only a proposal. The Bill had received its First Reading but had not yet finished going through Parliament and was not yet law. So everything below describes powers that are being proposed, not powers that can already be used.

Why Singapore wants a National Scams List

A scam operation almost never uses just one account. A syndicate might use one bank account to collect money, a mobile line to call victims, a social media profile to promote a fake investment, and a chat account to keep the conversation going. Each company involved usually sees only its own small piece of the puzzle.

For example, a bank might notice strange transfers but not know that the customer’s phone number has already shown up in scam reports. A telco might see suspicious activity but not know that an online account is sending victims towards a flagged payment account. When these pieces stay separate, action is slower.

The NSL is meant to close that gap. The Ministry of Home Affairs says it would help the Police and service providers share scam-related information. That information could include known scam tools such as bank accounts, phone lines, and online accounts, along with the identities of the people behind them.

What the new Anti-Scam Bill proposes

The Bill would update several existing laws, including the Protection from Scams Act 2025, the Online Criminal Harms Act 2023, and the Police Force Act 2004. It sets up the legal basis for sharing certain information and acting on scam warning signs.

The Bill is about more than the list itself. It also introduces three types of orders aimed at the services that scammers rely on:

• Disclosure Orders, which can require a provider to hand over specific information.
• Account Disabling Orders, which can require an account, or a group of accounts that meet stated conditions, to be switched off for a short time.
• Service Limitation Orders, which can block a named person from using specific scam-enabling services for up to three years.

These tools are meant to work together. Shared information can reveal a suspicious link, an order can stop an account from being used, and a longer service restriction can be placed on someone assessed as likely to keep helping scammers.

Disclosure Orders would help information flow

Under the Bill, an authorised officer could issue a Disclosure Order to a service provider. The order can ask for information about certain accounts, users, or scam-related activity, where getting that information is needed or useful to prevent a scam offence.

The term “service provider” is deliberately broad. It can cover banks, payment firms, digital token (crypto) service providers, telcos, and online service providers. It can also reach supporting services such as web hosting and domain-name registration, plus other services named in the rules that might help scams happen.

For banks, there is one extra condition. A Disclosure Order about customer information would only have effect if the Monetary Authority of Singapore has issued the notice requiring the bank, or that class of banks, to comply. This shows the Bill is designed to work alongside existing financial rules, not to ignore them.

Account Disabling Orders would stop suspicious use

The Police could also issue an Account Disabling Order when an officer suspects, or has reason to believe, that an account has been used, or will be used, to prepare for or carry out a scam offence. The order can name a specific account, or set out conditions that a provider must use to find the affected accounts.

The accounts covered go well beyond ordinary bank accounts. They include bank accounts, payment accounts, digital token accounts, phone line accounts, and online accounts.

An order can last up to 30 days, and it can be extended once for up to another 30 days. “Disabling” does not always mean closing an account for good. For a money account, the order might block deposits, transfers, receipts, or withdrawals. For a phone or online account, it might block contact with certain people.

Service Limitation Orders would focus on a named person

A Service Limitation Order works differently. Instead of targeting one account, it targets one person. If an authorised officer suspects, or has reason to believe, that the person will use a scam-enabling service to commit or help a scam offence, the provider can be told to cut off that service for up to three years.

This would build on the Facility Restriction Framework introduced in October 2025. The Ministry of Home Affairs said that, as at 30 June 2026, the framework covered 1,423 money mules, 1,439 SIM card mules, and 53 corporate mules. The Bill would make compliance less dependent on companies cooperating voluntarily or on separate industry-by-industry measures.

Is the National Scams List a public blacklist?

The official First Reading material does not describe the NSL as a public website where anyone can search for a person’s name, phone number, or bank account. Instead, it is a platform for sharing scam information between the Police and service providers.

That difference matters. A public blacklist could lead to harassment, cases of mistaken identity, and misuse of personal data. A controlled sharing system limits access to the organisations that actually need the information to stop or detect scams.

The Bill also proposes confidentiality rules. Information in these orders, or given under a Disclosure Order, generally cannot be shared or used for anything outside scam prevention or detection, unless the law, an order, or a court allows it. Providers and the people who receive the information must take the required steps to keep it safe.

Breaking these confidentiality duties without a reasonable excuse could itself be an offence. For an individual, the proposed maximum is a S$125,000 fine, up to three years in jail, or both. For an organisation such as a company, the maximum fine is S$250,000.

What safeguards are built in

Anti-scam action needs to be fast, but it also needs checks, because a genuine account can sometimes look unusual. The Bill includes several safeguards, though some of the finer details may be set out later in subsidiary rules or in how the system is run day to day.

First, an order must be tied to the scam-related grounds set out in the law. Second, Account Disabling Orders have time limits. Third, a person whose account is disabled can appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner can appoint an officer of at least Superintendent rank, or an equivalent authorised officer, to decide the appeal.

The disabling order stays in force while the appeal is being looked at. This favours stopping the scam quickly, even though it may briefly inconvenience a genuine user. An officer can also cancel or change an order. An Account Disabling Order can be extended only once, and the extra period cannot go beyond 30 days.

The Bill also protects a provider and its staff or agents from being sued or charged for following an order, as long as they act in good faith and with reasonable care. This is meant to stop providers from hesitating when quick action is needed.

What this means for ordinary Singaporeans

For most people, the Bill should not change normal online banking, mobile, or social media use. Its main effect would be felt only when an account matches scam warning signs or is linked to suspected scam activity. Still, it makes account security and responsible account use more important than ever.

Do not let strangers or casual contacts use your bank, phone, chat, marketplace, or social media accounts. Do not hand over passwords, one-time codes, or account recovery details for a fee. Even when the request is dressed up as a “job”, “account testing”, or “marketing support”, your account can end up as part of a scam chain.

If a genuine account is suddenly restricted, contact the provider through its official channel, secure the account, and keep records that show normal ownership and use. Helpful records might include identity checks, explanations for large transactions, business invoices, employment documents, and proof that you reported any suspicious access quickly.

What businesses and platforms should prepare for

The Bill would place real duties on a wide range of providers. They may need systems that can receive valid legal orders, match accounts against stated conditions, block only the uses named in the order, and send required information securely.

Businesses will also need clear escalation routes so staff can tell a real order apart from an impersonation attempt. A scammer could pretend to be an officer and ask a provider to reveal information. Verification, access controls, audit logs, and staff training will all be important.

At the same time, providers should plan for customer support. Someone hit by an Account Disabling Order may need a clear explanation of what has been blocked, how to protect the account, and how to appeal. A fast anti-scam system works better when genuine users can sort out mistakes without being sent round in circles.

The practical takeaway

The National Scams List is best understood as shared anti-scam infrastructure, not a public naming-and-shaming list. The Bill would give the Police legal tools to get information, switch off risky accounts for a short time, and restrict services supplied to named people.

If Parliament passes the Bill, its real impact will depend on how it is run. Accurate warning signs, secure information sharing, fair and measured orders, and quick handling of appeals will all matter. For the public, the safest habit stays simple. Guard every account as carefully as a bank account, because even a chat login or a marketplace profile can be used to reach and trick victims.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. Can a scam victim ask for an account to be added to the National Scams List?

The published material does not set out a direct public nomination process. If you are a victim, report the account and your evidence through official channels such as the Police, ScamShield, your bank, or the platform, so the information can be assessed.

2. Would being recorded in the NSL automatically give someone a criminal record?

No. Nothing in the proposal suggests that. Information used to detect or disrupt scams is not the same as a criminal conviction. A criminal record normally comes from being charged and convicted, not from an account being flagged or restricted.

3. Can an employer use the NSL to screen job applicants?

The Bill does not describe the NSL as a hiring database. The confidentiality rules also limit how shared information can be used. Employers should not assume they will get access, or that they may use it for unrelated hiring decisions.

4. Can a person ask for wrong NSL information to be corrected?

The announcement does not describe a separate correction process for the NSL. If you are affected by an order, use the appeal route that applies and give the provider and the Police clear evidence of the mistake.

5. Can a bank or platform charge a customer an admin fee after an account is flagged?

The Bill does not create a general fee for customers whose accounts are flagged. Any charge would need its own contract or legal basis, so query it with the provider.